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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LARAE JENSEN nka LARAE THORPE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
RAYMOND JENSEN, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No. 900372-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this 
matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(h) Utah Code Ann. (1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether the trial court's findings and 
conclusions are based on appropriate factors. This issue 
presents a question of law and requires the appellate court to 
review the lower court's decision without according deference 
thereto. Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1977). 
B. Whether the trial court's findings and 
conclusions supporting the initial custody award are supported 
by the evidence. This issue presents a question of fact and 
requires the appellate court to review the lower court's 
decision applying the clearly erroneous standard of review. 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
C. Whether the trial court improperly failed to 
consider the changed circumstances of the noncustodial parent 
as well as the custodial parent. This issue presents a 
question of law and requires the appellate court to review the 
lower court's decision without according deference thereto. 
Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989). 
D. Whether the petitioner established substantial 
change of circumstances to allow the trial court to reconsider 
the issue of custody. This issue requires the appellate court 
to uphold the lower court's decision absent a showing of an 
abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. Maughan v. Maughan, 
770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a Supplemental Order of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sevier County, Honorable Don 
V. Tibbs, Denying and Reaffirming Plaintiff's Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce as to Jamie Christina Jensen and Josie 
McKele Jensen and the Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. This matter was originally appealed to 
this Court under Case No. 870513-CA. This Court remanded the 
case, and the actions of the District Court after the remand 
are the subject of this appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
A. Plaintiff LaRae Jensen and Defendant Raymond 
Jensen, were married on September 27, 1979. Three children 
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were born to the parties during the course of the marriage and 
Raymond adopted LaRae's two children from a previous marriage. 
(R, T-3, p. 11, 19-20; R, T-2, p. 7). 
B. The parties filed for divorce and a Decree of 
Divorce was entered on February 10, 1987. (R, T-2, p. 15). 
The Decree awarded Raymond custody of all five children subject 
to LaRae's right to reasonable visitation. The Decree also 
contained a provision that the District Court would review the 
custody order after 90 days in the event that the two older 
children filed written elections requesting that LaRae assume 
custody of them. (R, 60-62). The District Court failed to 
enter Findings and Conclusions supporting the custody award. 
C. I After the Decree was signed, LaRae took all five 
children to visit their grandparents. During the visit, one of 
the children was struck and killed by an automobile. From 
February until June of 1987, Raymond allowed LaRae to take 
physical custody of the youngest child. During this same 
period of time, the two older children went to live with LaRae 
and filed elections to remain in her custody. (R, p. 241-242). 
D.| In June of 1987, LaRae filed an affidavit seeking 
custody of all four children, and child support. She argued in 
her affidavit that the following factors established a change 
of circumstances: 
(1) she had physical custody of three of the 
four children; 
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(2) the children in her custody had established 
ties to their new community; 
(3) she had remarried, was working part-time, 
and was financially secure; 
(4) the child in Raymond's custody was separated 
from her siblings, was unhappy, and lacked parental 
supervision; 
(5) Raymond failed to arrange visitation with 
the children in her custody; 
(6) Raymond had failed to assist her financially 
with the support of the children in her custody; and 
(7) Raymond was using the children to manipulate 
her. 
(R, p. 71-76). 
E. Both parties presented evidence at a hearing on 
September 30, 1987. The District Court ruled from the bench 
that LaRae had failed to establish a material change of 
circumstances. (R, T-2). 
F. An Order was entered on October 19, 1987, 
amending the decree to award LaRae custody of the two older 
children. The Order also denied LaRae's petition to gain 
custody of the other children. (R, p. 117-118). Once again, 
the District Court failed to enter findings to support its 
decision. LaRae appealed the District Court's decision. 
G. On June 1, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
a decision vacating the Order Denying Plaintiff's Petition to 
Modify and remanding the case for entry of appropriate findings 
for both the initial award of custody and the Order Denying 
Modification. (Addendum, A-l). 
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H. On or about March 14, 1990, Supplemental Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed with the District 
Court by defendant's attorney. Plaintiff filed an objection to 
the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
hearing was held on May 16, 1990 for the purpose of settling 
the Findings of Fact. Supplemental Findings were executed and 
entered by the District Court on June 5, 1990 and the 
Supplemental Order was entered on July 11, 1990. (R, p. 
235-244; 247-248). It is from this Order that plaintiff 
appealjs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court's Supplemental Findings of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law do not comply with the directives of 
this Court on remand of this matter nor do they comply with the 
requirements of well-established Utah case law. They fail to 
address the specific factors pertinent to the District Court's 
decision and do not address the particular needs of each child 
or the ability of each parent to meet those needs. The 
Findings are not sufficiently detailed, do not indicate that 
the District Court's process in reaching its custody 
determination was logical and properly supported and, in many 
instances, are clearly erroneous. The failure of the trial 
court to make findings on all material issues is reversible 
error because the facts in the record are not "clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
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favor of the [District Court's] judgment." Acton v. Deliran, 
737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). The Court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are colored by bias towards women 
pursuing other than the traditional role of homemaker and rely, 
almost exclusively, on factors which this Court has held are 
improper for consideration in a custody dispute. 
The District Court's Supplemental Findings relating to 
the modification hearing of September 30, 1987 do not compare 
the evidence presented at the modification hearing with the 
factors underlying the District Court's original award and, 
therefore, ignore this Court's directive on remand. The 
modification hearing findings fail to address the best 
interests of the children or the changed circumstances asserted 
by the appellant. The Supplemental Findings and Conclusions, 
instead, appear to be based on the District Court's concept 
that the appellant was at fault for the failure of the marriage 
and that she was not entitled to custody because of her past 
moral indiscretions. 
An examination of the factors set forth in Hutchison 
v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), establishes that 
appellant met both parts of the test as set forth in Elmer v. 
Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), and that the District Court's 
denial of appellant's Petition for Modification constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ARE NOT PROPERLY BASED UPON APPROPRIATE FACTORS 
AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
A. Findings of Fact: Original Custody Determination. 
On remand, this Court instructed the District Court to 
enter appropriate findings and that: 
Those findings should articulate the 
considerations behind the initial award of 
custody and the order denying modification, 
and should reflect the current legal 
standard for modification of custody. 
(Page 5 of the Court's Opinion, Item 1 in the Addendum). An 
examination of the District Court's Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereafter "Findings and 
Conclusions") reveals that it failed to comply with the 
appellate court directive on remand. 
The Findings and Conclusions eventually entered by the 
District Court fall far short of the standard set by the Utah 
Supreme Court and this Court. The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
. . . a custody decision must be supported 
by written findings and conclusions. These 
findings should refer to the specific 
factors pertinent to the decision of what 
placement is in the best interests of the 
child, "including the particular needs of 
[each] child and the ability of each parent 
to meet those needs." (citation omitted) 
Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 626 (Utah 1987). This Court 
has held that: 
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A custody award must be firmly anchored on 
findings of fact that (1) are sufficiently 
detailed, (2) include enough facts to 
disclose the process through which the 
ultimate conclusion is reached, (3) indicate 
the process is logical and properly 
supported, and (4) are not clearly 
erroneous. (citations omitted) If this is 
not accomplished by the trial court, the 
issue of custody must be reversed unless the 
record itself supports the award to the 
standard reiterated in Acton. 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987). In 
Marchant, this court cited the standard reiterated in Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987): 
Failure of the trial court to make findings 
on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are "clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment." 
A review of the District Court's Findings and 
Conclusions reveals that they do not meet the standards which 
the appellate courts of this state have held are applicable to 
findings and conclusions in child custody disputes. The 
Findings and Conclusions are not sufficiently detailed and do 
not include enough facts to disclose a legitimate process 
through which the District Court reached its ultimate 
conclusion. To the contrary, the Findings and ultimate 
Conclusions in this matter are the result of the District 
Court's concentration on factors which this Court has held are 
improper. The Findings and Conclusions are not the product of 
a process which is logical and properly supported. 
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The Findings of Fact are subject to the "clearly 
erroneous" standard of review. The conclusions derived 
therefrom, however, and the determination of whether the 
Findings and Conclusions are based on appropriate factors is a 
question of law and requires the appellate court to review the 
lower court's decision without granting deference thereto. 
Marchant, supra, at 203. 
The record reflects that the trial court had 
difficulty with its task on remand. Addressing the appellant's 
attorney, the District Court inquired: 
What I'd like to know is do you feel that 
the court of appeals meant for me to go back 
and rehear this case? Or do you feel they 
just meant for me to make some findings, 
based upon my original order? 
(R, T-4, p. 5). The trial court was at a loss as to how to 
proceed and clearly relied heavily upon the input and 
assistance of respondent's attorney in completing the Findings 
which were eventually entered. (R, T-4, p. 5). In determining 
how to proceed in the hearing on appellant's Objections to the 
respondent's Proposed Supplemental Findings ("Findings 
Hearing"), the District Court stated: 
Well, why don't we just go by paragraph by 
paragraph [of the respondent's proposed 
supplemental findings] and let's just go 
that way and you show me where, in the 
finding, upon what you based it. 
I think I remember the case because it was 
an unusual case. It will probably come back 
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to me. Right now I'm having a little hard 
time remembering it, but I do remember it 
was quite an unusual case. 
So why don't we just start and we'll go step 
by step through this supplemental findings 
and then I'll refer to your objection and 
then we'll see where he basis [sic] it in 
the record; All right? 
(R, T-4, p. 6). The Findings and Conclusions which were 
eventually entered are a product of the bias of the 
respondent's attorney and the District Court's fading memory of 
the original custody hearing. The hearing transcript contains 
virtually no specific reference by either the District Court or 
respondent's attorney to the trial record. 
In the Findings Hearing, appellant's counsel objected 
to respondent's proposed Finding No. 5 because the Finding 
failed to define which parent was the primary caretaker. 
Appellant's counsel argued that the factors set forth in Pusey 
v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), needed to be considered. 
The Pusey factors were never addressed and apparently never 
considered by the District Court. Finding No. 5 was, pursuant 
to appellant's objection, modified to state that Mr. Jensen: 
Was the primary caretaker of the children 
after plaintiff (LaRae) became actively 
involved in the ambulance program; that 
defendant was working in his own business, 
but was also taking care of the children; 
that the plaintiff found interests outside 
of the home and defendant had become the 
primary caretaker of the children. 
(R, 238). 
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Finding No. 5 reveals the District Court's basic, 
underlying motive and grounds for awarding custody of the 
children to respondent: the appellant had found interests 
outside of the home. On that basis, the District Court 
determined that the defendant had become the primary caretaker 
of the children despite its recognition that defendant, too, 
was working outside of the home. This Court has stated that it 
will not: 
Condone any finding of fact which might be 
interpreted as penalizing a woman for 
acquiring skills in other than the most 
fundamental and traditional areas necessary 
for functioning as a wife and mother. 
Marchant, supra, at 204. 
This bias towards women pursuing other than the 
traditional role of homemaker permeates the District Court's 
findings. Finding No. 6, for example, states that appellant 
placed her personal interests ahead of those of the family to 
the extent that she neglected the family "undermined the home, 
caused turmoil and dissention, . . ." (R, 238). Finding No. 6 
shows that the District Court, to a great extent, "based its 
conclusion that defendant was the proper custodial parent on 
the outmoded concept of fault on the part of plaintiff." 
Marchant, supra, at 203. At the conclusion of the divorce 
trial, after the District Court had granted custody of the 
children to respondent, the District Court made this 
statement: "The plaintiff, I realize this is not what she 
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contemplated. That I can't help, because she brought it upon 
herself.M (R, T-3, p. 205). 
Finding No. 6 is objectionable on other grounds as 
well. The District Court's conclusion is contrary to the 
testimony heard by the District Court, in particular as the 
testimony relates to the Findings in the subparts of Finding 
No. 6. For example, in subparagraph (A) the District Court 
held that: "LaRae developed a pre-occupying interest in a 
Sevier County ambulance program . . . .M (R, 238). While the 
evidence established that LaRae volunteered on a regular basis 
for the Sevier County Ambulance Program, there was no evidence 
before the District Court to establish that her commitment to 
the program was "pre-occupying." 
Additionally, the evidence before the District Court 
was uncontroverted that while LaRae may have been experiencing 
difficulty in her marriage, she was at all times a loving, 
caring mother who spent time with all of her children and 
provided for their needs. (R, T-3, p. 21-29; 56-58; 80, 83; 
87-88) . 
In Finding No. 6(B), the District Court found that 
LaRae*s interest in the ambulance program was to the exclusion 
of her family welfare and that she "was gone for periods of 
time on most days" and that "she did not make adequate 
provision for the children while she was gone." (R, 238). 
Again, the District Court's bias against women pursuing 
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interests outside of the home is evident. Furthermore, LaRae's 
work with the ambulance program was not to the exclusion of her 
family's welfare. The fact that both the District Court and 
the defendant deemed it LaRae's responsibility to make 
provisions for the care of the children in her absence 
contradicts the District Court's finding that defendant was the 
primary caretaker and establishes that, during the course of 
their marriage, both parties looked upon LaRae as the primary 
caretaker. The responsibility for the children's care 
ultimately fell to her. 
In Pusey, supra, at 120 , the Supreme Court wrote that 
the choice in "competing child custody claims" should be based 
on "function-related factors." One of the most prominent 
factors which must be considered is "the identity of the 
primary caretaker during the marriage." While the evidence 
tended to establish that respondent assisted in the care of the 
children, it is apparent that, at least as far as the parties 
were concerned, appellant had the identity of primary 
caretaker. There is never any mention by the District Court 
that, during the term of his marriage to appellant, respondent 
shared in the responsibility of arranging babysitters or child 
care for the children. Instead, any reference to respondent's 
care of the children is in terms of Raymond doing LaRae's job. 
Conspicuously absent from the District Court's Findings and 
Conclusions is any reference to the evidence that the 
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respondent was often at his place of business from before 7:00 
a.m. until past 10:00 p.m. and that, on most days, he was at 
work until at least after 5:00 or 6:00 in the evening. (R, T-2, 
p. 58). There is no evidence that the respondent ever 
concerned himself with arranging for babysitters for the 
children because of his daily absence from the home. 
In Finding 6(c), the District Court found, among other 
things, that "while working in the ambulance program [LaRae] 
took extended trips with male members of the ambulance crew. 
She had an intimate affair with Randy Thorpe. . . . " (R, 
239). At the time this Finding was entered, there was no 
evidence before the District Court that LaRae took extended 
trips with male members of the ambulance crew. While the 
District Court heard some evidence that LaRae spent some time 
at the home of Randy Thorpe, there was absolutely no evidence 
supporting the District Court's finding that she had an 
"intimate affair" with him. Both LaRae Jensen and Randy Thorpe 
testified that their relationship was not an "intimate 
affair." (R, T-3, p. 42-43; 190-191). 
In the same Finding, the District Court found that 
LaRae had "elected" to have a baby by an individual named John 
Bergin. (R, 239). This Finding is particularly interesting in 
light of the Order and Findings which the District Court made 
from the bench. Regarding that child, the District Court 
stated that: 
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It is the order of this court that this 
court so finds that this is a child of this 
marriage period. This child was born under 
the marriage contract while these parties 
were married. This is the child of the 
defendant, as well as the child of the 
plaintiff. That is the order of the court. 
There will be no more discussion concerning 
it not being the child. If it's brought to 
my intention that there's any discussion, 
from either of the parties, to these 
children, contrary, I will consider that a 
contempt to this court and will use my 
authority to punish by jail. 
(R, T-3, p. 205). 
It is evident from the tenor of the District Court's 
findings that it placed an improperly high emphasis on 
appellant's moral character in reaching its custody 
determination. The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
[A] determination of the children's best 
interest turns on numerous factors, each of 
which may vary in importance according to 
the facts in a particular case. Moral 
character is only one of a myriad of factors 
the court may properly consider in 
determining a child's best interests. In 
this regard we have previously held that a 
parent's extra-marital sexual relationship 
alone is insufficient to justify a change in 
custody. 
Sanderson v. Tryon, supra, at 627. 
The District Court's Finding, issued from the bench, 
illustrates that the appellant's moral character and her 
interests outside of the home were the primary factors behind 
the original custody determination. The District Court stated: 
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After hearing all this evidence, I'm not 
convinced that it's for the best interest of 
the children that they be awarded to the 
plaintiff. I do that with difficulty 
because she's the mother. But no longer can 
I just award children to the mother when she 
can completely sissy [sic] disobeys and goes 
contrary to the rules of society. 
(R, T-3, p. 203). 
The extent to which the District Court would deprive 
appellant of the right to have any interests whatsoever outside 
of the home is illustrated by its Finding No. 6(D). In that 
Finding, the District Court found that the appellant "acquired 
a horse for her personal use which took more time from 
family." (R, 239). This Finding should not have been a factor 
in the District Court's custody determination. See, Marchant, 
supra, at 204. The District Court would condemn appellant for 
having any interests outside of the home, even though the 
evidence established that, while LaRae experienced difficulty 
in her marriage and developed personal interests, she was at 
all times a loving, caring mother who spent time with all of 
her children and provided for all of their needs. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed the standard upon 
which judicial custody determinations must be based: 
[A] judicial determination of custody based 
on the child's best interests is based on an 
objective and impartial comparison of the 
parenting skills, character, and abilities 
of both parents in light of a realistic and 
objective appraisal of the needs of a child. 
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Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989). The Findings and 
Conclusions are void of any impartial comparison of parenting 
skills or objective appraisal of the children's needs. The 
District Court's focus, instead, is on disciplining the 
"wayward wife.M 
B. Supplemental Findings: Modification Hearing 
9/30/87. 
The District Court's Findings and Conclusions relating 
to the Modification Hearing, held September 30, 1987, are 
equally inadequate and flawed. Significantly, while it makes 
brief reference to the material changes and circumstances 
alleged by appellant, none of the District Court's Findings 
address any of those issues or factors. In Finding No. 13 of 
the Supplemental Findings, the District Court concludes, 
without indicating the steps by which it reached its ultimate 
conclusion and without addressing the factors raised by the 
appellant, that no changed conditions had been shown with 
regard to either the respondent or with regard to the 
appellant. (R, p. 243). In its opinion remanding this matter, 
this Court commented that: 
Other than an unsigned statement by the 
court that Raymond is still the primary 
caretaker, the trial court's order neither 
discusses LaRae's evidence in support of her 
affidavit, nor compares that evidence with 
the factors underlying the original award. 
(Opinion, p. 4). 
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In addition to failing to address the changed 
conditions alleged by appellant, the District Court made 
Findings and Conclusions contrary to and unsupported by the 
evidence. After the divorce, one of the parties' children, 
Savannah, was killed when she was struck by a car. In its 
Finding No. 4, the District Court found that Savannah's death 
was a factor which caused respondent to "permit" the 
appellant's parents to assume custody of the minor child, 
Josie. This Finding is contrary to the evidence which 
establishes that Raymond gave LaRae custody of Josie in 
February, before Savannah's death. (R, T-2, p. 16-17). Based 
on Raymond's own testimony, he was experiencing difficulty with 
the two older children, Shalauna and Stacey. (R, T-2, p. 68 
and 69). Raymond told LaRae to pick the children up, including 
the baby, because he couldn't cope with them. (R, T-2, p. 16). 
The District Court heard uncontroverted testimony that 
Raymond also asked Mr. and Mrs. Robert Proctor, appellant's 
parents, to take permanent custody of Josie. (R, T-2, p. 41 
and 72). Raymond knew at all times that LaRae actually had 
custody of Josie. (R, T-2, p. 72-73). The District Court's 
Finding on this matter does not recognize any of these critical 
factors which were established by the evidence. 
Finding No. 7 of the Supplemental Findings is 
similarly flawed. In this Finding, the District Court states 
that "the temporary arrangement was terminated by Raymond. The 
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grandparents had allowed LaRae to take care of Josie and LaRae 
refused to return the child to Raymond." This Finding implies 
that Raymond terminated the arrangement when he learned LaRae 
had custody of the child. Raymond testified that he knew where 
the baby was during the four months LaRae had custody of her. 
(R, T-2, p. 73). The evidence before the District Court 
established that, following Savannah's death, Raymond was 
willing to allow the Proctors' to take custody of Josie and 
attempted to have LaRae sign an agreement to that effect. When 
LaRae refused to sign the agreement, Raymond demanded that 
LaRae return Josie to his custody. (R, T-2, p. 73; 38-41; 
30). Finding No. 7, therefore, is directly contrary to the 
evidence, including respondent's own testimony. 
In Finding No. 9 of the Supplemental Findings, the 
District Court found that "since June of 1987 the children have 
been well cared for and are making a good adjustment." (R, p. 
242). Contrary to the requirements established by this Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court, this Finding contains no detail and 
absolutely no subsidiary facts to provide any hint of how the 
District Court reached this Finding. None of the points raised 
by LaRae were discussed or addressed by the District Court. 
The Findings even fail to make even the briefest mention of the 
nature of the circumstances and conditions in the home of the 
custodial parent. This Finding, while apparentlv critical to 
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the District Court's determination, fails to meet the standard 
required in Smith and Marchant, supra. 
The testimony of Hilda Gentry, a witness who refused 
to testify for the plaintiff except under subpoena, established 
that the minor child, Jamie, a 7 year old, spent hours every 
week at a Conoco gas station/mini-store. Ms. Gentry testified 
that the store is near a busy highway and that Jamie would ride 
her bike down to the store at night, three to four times a 
week, although Raymond had never made arrangements with her to 
watch the child. According to Ms. Gentry, when she began 
working the day shift, Jamie was still spending substantial 
amounts of time at the store in the evenings. Jamie was there 
so much that the owners became upset. (R, T-2, p. 46-55). 
Another witness testified that she would see Jamie 
riding her bike after dark, approximately a mile out of town. 
(R, T-2, p. 58). The same witness testified that she would see 
Raymond in his shop working as late as 10:00 p.m. and Saturdays 
as well. (R, T-2, p. 58, 61). 
Additionally, the evidence before the District Court 
directly controverted the District Court's statement that the 
children were making a good adjustment. Raymond Jensen's 
testimony established that Jamie missed her mother and older 
siblings, and was having problems at school. (R, T-2, p. 85). 
Josie spent significant amounts of time with babysitters and 
experienced difficulty in potty training (R, T-2, p. 58, 61; 
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83-84, 93). The facts illustrate the inaccuracy of Finding No. 
10 that, "LaRae did not show a substantial and material change 
effecting [sic] Raymond's parenting ability which would justify 
reopening the custody question." (R, 242-243)). 
In Finding No. 11 the District Court states that: 
Josie was out of Raymond's care for a period 
of about three months. A part of the period 
resulted from LaRae's refusal to return the 
child. The visitation with the grandparents 
was intended to help resolve the emotion and 
traumatic problems facing all the parties 
because of the death of Savannah. 
(R, 243). 
Contrary to the District Court's Finding, the evidence 
established that Josie was out of Raymond's care for at least 
four months. (R, T-2, p. 16-17; 41; 73-73). Additionally, 
Raymond testified that when he went to pick up Josie he was 
able to take her. (R, T-2, p. 86). The District Court also 
erred in implying in this Finding that the visitation was meant 
to be with the grandparents when Raymond testified that he knew 
Josie was with her mother. (R, T-2, p. 73). 
Finally, the District Court found in Findings No. 13 
and 14 that there were no changed conditions with regard to 
Raymond or LaRae. It made these Findings without addressing, 
even superficially, the points raised in LaRae's affidavit 
alleging the changed circumstances upon which her Petition 
relied. Nor did the District Court address the testimony of 
witnesses establishing that Raymond's long working hours, among 
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other things, resulted in an unstable situation for the 
children whose desire it has been to be reunited with their 
mother and older siblings. (R, T-2, p. 72, 85). 
The Findings and Conclusions entered by the District 
Court after remand by this Court lack sufficient detail and 
facts to disclose the process through which the ultimate 
conclusion was reached. There is no indication that the 
District Court's decision process was logical and properly 
supported. In fact, the evidence establishes that a number of 
the District Court's Findings and Conclusions are clearly 
erroneous. They are also contrary to law because they are 
based on improper factors including the District Court's belief 
that a woman's place is in the home and that any moral 
indiscretion makes a parent unfit to have custody of her 
children. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT ESTABLISHED MATERIAL CHANGES IN THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL 
CUSTODY AWARD WAS BASED AND THE DENIAL OF HER PETITION 
FOR MODIFICATION CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Apply the Applicable 
Legal Standard in Denying Appellant's Petition 
for Modification. 
In the opinion remanding this matter, this Court 
directed the trial court that its Findings and Conclusions 
"should articulate the consideration behind the initial award 
of custody and the Order denying modification, and should 
reflect the current legal standard for modification of 
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custody." Opinion, p. 5. The trial court's Findings relevant 
to the Petition for Modification do not articulate the 
considerations behind the initial award of custody and the 
Order denying modification. There is also no indication that 
the trial court applied the current legal standard as directed 
by this Court. This Court instructed the trial court that its 
Findings and Conclusions must reflect the current legal 
standard as set forth in Elmer v. Elmer, supra. 
Elmer sets out a two-part test which must be applied 
in determining the changed-circumstances issue. In setting 
forth that two-part test, the court relied on the language of 
Hoqqe v. Hoqqe, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982): 
Hogge held that a parent seeking a change in 
custody of a child must first establish that 
there has been a substantial and material 
change in the circumstances upon which the 
original custody award was based, and second 
and thereafter, that a change in custody is 
in the best interests of the child. 
Elmer at 602. The Elmer court also held that: 
[W]e have held that a change in the 
circumstances of the noncustodial parent may 
bear upon the issue of whether a change of 
custody may be appropriate. (Citation 
omitted.) 
The Findings and Conclusions do not address, even 
superficially, the material changes asserted by the appellant 
in her Petition. In her affidavit supporting her Petition for 
Modification, she attested to the following material changes 
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having taken place in her life and in the conditions under 
which her two youngest children, those in Raymond's custody, 
were living; 
- Since the entry of the decree of divorce, LaRae 
had had physical custody of the minor daughter, 
Josie, for six months and custody of Shalauna and 
Stacey for almost the entire period; 
- She had obtained full-time employment and her 
work schedule allowed her to attend to the 
children's needs in the mornings before school 
and to be home when they arrive home from school 
in the afternoon. Her husband and parents were 
available to assist in the care of the children 
in LaRae's absence; 
- Since the divorce, LaRae had married a man with a 
stable job with the State of Utah and had built a 
stable relationship; 
- The minor daughter, Jamie, had been separated 
from her mother, grandparents, and siblings for 
nearly six months and had indicated a strong 
desire to be reunited and live with her mother 
and siblings. Jamie had indicated a dislike of 
living alone with her father; 
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; - The father's work schedule kept him away from 
home long hours each day and, as a result, Jamie, 
then 7 years old, was left without supervision 
for more than two hours each evening; 
-. Raymond attempted to obtain LaRae*s signature on 
documents which would have potentially 
relinquished her parental rights. (R, 100-104). 
The District Court did not even address the issues 
l • 
raised by LaRae in her affidavit or the testimony of witnesses 
that Jamie would spend long periods hanging out at a Conoco gas 
station/mini-store, including hours after dark. (R, T-2, p. 
46-55). Other evidence, discussed in Point I above, that Jamie 
would be seen riding her bike after dark approximately a mile 
out-of-town, that Raymond would work in his shop as late as 
10:00 p.m. and on Saturdays, and that the youngest child, 
Josie, spent significant amounts of time with various and 
sundry babysitters was also not addressed. 
The District Court did not discuss or address the 
crucial factors raised by LaRae, but nevertheless found that 
she had failed to establish that there had been a material 
change in the circumstances upon which the original custody 
award was based. The District Court's Supplemental Findings 
and Conclusions fail to find or conclude that the best 
interests of Jamie and Josie would be served by modifying the 
custody Order. Apparently, the District Court did not look 
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beyond the improper factors upon which it had based its 
original Order. In the Order and Findings issued by the 
District Court from the bench in the Order to Show Cause 
hearing, that Court stated: 
I just frankly am not convinced there's a 
material change of circumstances and I 
recognize the fact that there is an 
advantage for your children being together 
and that's one reason I made the decision 
like I did to start with. But I just feel 
that Mr. Jensen's done all he possibly could 
do to take care of these children, and I 
recognize it's all not glorious and there's 
been problems. It would just seem to me 
that if I found a material change of 
circumstances, it's because she now marries 
the guy that she has the situation develop 
with and it would just be creating a real 
problem and I find that Mr. Jensen is still 
the primary caretaker of these children and 
that the children should remain with him. 
(Emphasis added.) (R, T-2, p. 115.) 
The District Court, inexplicably, does not address any of the 
factors raised by LaRae, and yet considers pre-divorce 
conditions (LaRae's alleged "relationship" with Randy Thorpe), 
which has substantially changed due to LaRae's marriage. The 
District Court also based its determination on its Finding that 
Mr. Jensen was still the primary caretaker of Jamie and Josie. 
As the District Court had granted Mr. Jensen sole custody of 
those two children in the original decree, this Finding is 
irrelevant to the material issues before the Court on LaRae1s 
Petition. 
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B. The Material Changes Established by Appellant's 
Evidence Require a Modification of the Decree of 
Divorce to Award Custody of All of the Minor 
Children to Appellant. 
A review of the evidence ignored by the District 
Court, and applicable standards as expressed in the case law of 
this State, establish that the District Court's denial of 
appellant's Petition for Modification should be reversed and 
that this Court should order that appellant's Petition be 
granted. 
In Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), 
the Utah Supreme Court set forth certain relevant factors which 
are relevant in determining a child's best interests. 
Some factors the court may consider in 
determining the child's best interests 
relate primarily to the child's feelings or 
special needs: the preference of the child; 
keeping siblings together; the relative 
strength of the child's bond with one or 
both of the prospective custodians, and, in 
appropriate cases, the general interest in 
continuing previously determined custody 
arrangements where the child is happy and 
well-adjusted. Other factors relate 
primarily to the prospective custodians' 
character or status or to their capacity or 
willingness to function as parents: moral 
character and emotional stability; duration 
and depth of desire for custody; ability to 
provide personal rather than surrogate care; 
significant impairment of ability to 
function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons 
for having relinquished custody in the past; 
religious compatibility with the child; 
kinship, including, in extraordinary 
circumstances, step-parent status; and 
financial condition. 
Hutchison at 41. 
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A review of these factors reveals that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying appellant's Petition for 
Modification. 
There was incontroverted evidence of the minor 
daughter Jamie's strong preference to be with her mother and 
two older siblings. In his own testimony, Raymond Jensen 
admitted Jamie's strong desire to be with her mother and 
siblings and her unhappiness at being kept separate from them. 
Q. And you also testified, did you not, 
that at the little luncheon after the 
funeral that Jamie ran to her mother 
and said, "I want to be with my mom," 
or "I want to be with LaRae," or 
something to that effect? 
A, That's correct. 
Q. Has [Jamie] ever told you that at any 
other time? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Okay. Did she ever talk to you about 
wanting to be with Stacey and Shalauna, 
spend time with them? 
A. I'm sure she has. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Now isn't it true that in the 
month of February you let LaRae take 
Josie? 
A. That's true. 
Q. And that she had her for a continuous 
period of time, from early February 
until June 19th, when you went with the 
police and took Josie from her at 
Pleasant Grove? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. Okay. Now, you testified that when you 
called and says [sic], "I'm coming to 
get her," that she gave you some run 
around and said, "we might not be here" 
that sort of thing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But when you did go to get her, she 
was, in fact, in the home and you were 
able to get the children. 
A. She wasn't there that I could see. 
Shalauna was the only one that I could 
see there. 
Q. But you were able to get the children 
that day, weren't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you went home with her, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now did Jamie put up a fuss at that 
time and didn't want to go with you? 
A. She didn't want to go too bad. 
(R, T-2, p. 85-86). Other signs of Jamie's unhappiness and 
loneliness are evident in the amount of time she spent just 
hanging around the Conoco station/mini-store. 
This Court stated in its Opinion remanding this matter 
for the entry of Findings and Conclusions that: 
The hearing transcript reveals that keeping 
the children together was one reason for 
awarding initial custody to the father, but 
there is nothing to indicate why the court 
dispensed with that objective in awarding 
custody of only the older children to LaRae. 
(Opinion, p. 4). The District Court addresses the importance 
of keeping the children together in its Findings of Fact 
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relating to the original divorce trial. In its Supplemental 
Findings on the hearing to modify, however, there is no mention 
by the Court of the importance of keeping the children 
together. There is still, therefore, "nothing to indicate why 
the Court dispensed with that objective in awarding custody of 
only the older children to LaRae." The District Court was 
concerned with the difficulty Raymond would have in controlling 
the two older children if they were forced to stay with him 
against their will, but does not consider the impact which 
separating the children would have on the children. The 
District Court fails to acknowledge the ties between the 
children which may, in fact, be stronger than their ties to 
their father. Jamie, it was shown, was very unhappy being 
separated from her siblings. 
The testimony, as discussed above, is uncontroverted 
that the strength of Jamie's bond to her mother is much 
stronger and compelling than her bond to her father. This 
conclusion does not ignore the fact that Jamie certainly loves 
her father and knows that he loves her. That love, however, 
cannot overcome her sense of loss at being separated from her 
mother and siblings. Josie, naturally, was too young to voice 
any kind of preference or signify with which parent she had the 
strongest bond. Critical to the determination of Josie's 
custody and best interests is the fact that Raymond is not, in 
all likelihood, her biological father. The District Court 
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found that LaRae had "elected to have a baby by [John 
Bergin].M (R, p. 238.) LaRae testified that, because of 
Raymond's sexual preference, that she doubted very much that 
Josie was Raymond's child. (R, T-3, p. 20.) The District 
Court's Finding and Order that Josie was a child of the 
marriage and the child of Raymond cannot alter the biological 
reality. 
The final factor set forth in Hutchison relating to 
the child's feelings or special needs regards the general 
interest in continuing a custody arrangement where the child is 
happy and well-adjusted. There was no such interest in this 
case. The evidence, as discussed above, was uncontroverted 
that Jamie was not happy or well-adjusted. There was also 
testimony to the effect that the youngest child, Josie, was 
experiencing adjustment problems because of the significant 
amounts of time which she was spending with babysitters. (R, 
T-2, p. 58, 61; 83-84, 93). 
Another factor, the moral character and emotional 
stability of the parties was also not considered by the trial 
court and favors the awarding of custody to the appellant. The 
trial court obviously felt that Raymond's activity in the LDS 
Church was an important factor in determining who should be 
granted custody of the children in the original decree. 
(Finding 5C; R, 237). The District Court continued to weigh 
heavily LaRae's pre-divorce moral indiscretions without 
considering her change of circumstances. 
-31-
The facts presented by LaRae showed that she was 
happily married in a monogamous relationship with a man who 
apparently provided her much greater support than she had 
received from Raymond during the course of her marriage to 
him. Had the trial court been interested in looking at the 
factors presented by LaRae objectively, it would have seen that 
her marriage and home life at that time constituted a material 
and significant change from her situation immediately following 
the divorce and afforded a much more stable environment to the 
children than Raymond could offer. 
The duration and depth of LaRae's desire for custody 
of all of her children cannot be disputed. She fought hard for 
custody during the divorce trial and has been fighting to 
obtain that custody ever since. LaRae also provided 
uncontroverted testimony to the Court regarding her ability to 
provide personal rather than surrogate care for Jamie and 
Josie. As appellant has discussed above, LaRae testified that 
she had the ability to be with the children both before and 
after school and that her work schedule was flexible. The 
testimony, as discussed above, showed that Raymond, on the 
other hand, worked very long hours, relied on babysitters 
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extensively, and left Jamie to seek her own unsupervised 
diversions. 
This Court found, in its Opinion remanding this 
matter, that Raymond permitted LaRae to assume physical custody 
of Josie from February 1987 through June 1987. Testimony also 
showed that Raymond attempted to relinquish custody of Josie 
permanently to LaRae's parents. This Court stated in its 
earlier Opinion on this matter that without proper findings "it 
is difficult to distinguish Raymond's voluntary relinquishment 
of custody to LaRae from the situation in The District Court's 
Findings and Conclusions show that there is no distinction 
between Raymond's relinquishment of custody and the situation 
in Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982). In Tuckey, the 
mother left her children in her mother's care. The 
grandmother, in her daughter's absence, relinquished the 
children to their paternal grandparents. In that case the 
court held that: 
The conduct of the mother, coupled with the 
defendant's mother's release of the children 
to the paternal grandparents, and the events 
resulting from that act, clearly constitute 
a sufficient change in circumstance to 
warrant reconsideration of the custody issue 
in this instance. 
Tuckey at 90. Despite this principle of law, the District 
Court found that there were no material changes in 
circumstances to warrant reconsideration of its earlier custody 
determination. 
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Finally, there was a substantial change in LaRae's 
financial condition from the time of the divorce to the time of 
her Petition. At the time of the divorce, she was unemployed 
and alone. At the time of the Petition, on the other hand, she 
was married to a husband who had good, stable employment with 
the State of Utah and was herself employed. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's Findings and Conclusions are 
woefully inadequate and fail to comply with this Court's direct 
instructions given to the District Court on Remand. The 
Findings and Conclusions are clearly erroneous and the District 
Court's order denying appellant's petition must be reversed. 
Marchant, supra, at 203. 
The examination of the above factors establish that 
LaRae met both requirements of the Elmer test and that the trial 
court abused its discretion by denying her Petition for 
Modification. The change in circumstances was substantial and 
real. The best interests of the children require that they be 
reunited with their mother and siblings. This Court should 
reverse the District Court's denial of appellant's Petition and 
Order that custody of all of the children be granted to appellant 
DATED this O^^ day of December, 1990. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By kATl^t 
Don R. Schow 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals the denial of her petition to modify a 
divorce decree awarding custody of her minor children to their 
father. We vacate the order and remand for appropriate findings. 
Plaintiff LaRae Jensen and defendant Raymond Jensen were 
married on September 27, 1979, and divorced on February 10, 
1987. During the course of their marriage, the parties had 
three children, and Raymond adopted two of LaRae's children from 
a previous marriage. The divorce decree awarded Raymond custody 
of all five children subject to reasonable visitation by LaRae. 
The court also determined to review the custody order at the end 
of ninety days if the two oldest children filed written 
elections to have Larae assume custody of them. 
The day after the divorce decree was signed, LaRae took all 
five children to visit with her parents. During the visit, the 
second youngest child was struck and killed by an automobile. 
Raymond then permitted LaRae to assume physical custody of the 
youngest child from February until June of 1987. The two older 
children also went to live with LaRae and timely filed the 
written elections contemplated by the court in the divorce 
decree. 
decree was amended to award custody of the two older children to 
LaRae. The court stated that no finding of a change of 
circumstances was required because the court had previously 
reserved the option to amend the divorce decree in this manner. 
In the next paragraph, the court denied LaRae's -petition- to 
gain custody of all the children. No findings were made 
regarding this aspect of the trial court's order. LaRae appeals 
only from that portion of the order. 
Trial courts are given broad discretion in making custody 
determinations, and those decisions will not be upset on appeal 
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion or manifest 
injustice. Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 
1989). This discretion must be -exercised within the confines 
of the legal standards set by appellate courts, and the facts 
and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth in 
findings and conclusions.- i£. The importance of proper 
findings was emphasized in Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 
(Utah 1986) (citation omitted): 
To ensure that the trial court's custody 
determination, discretionary as it is, . . . 
is rationally based, it is essential that 
the court set forth in its findings of fact 
not only that it finds one parent to be the 
better person to care for the child, but 
also the basic facts which show why that 
ultimate conclusion is justified. . . . 
Proper findings of fact ensure that the 
ultimate custody award follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence and 
controlling legal principles. Adequate 
findings are also necessary for this Court 
to perform its assigned review function. 
See also Shioii v. Shioii, 671 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1983) 
(findings in divorce modification cases permit the aggrieved 
party to properly challenge the modification and the appellate 
court to properly review it). Findings may appear in an opinion 
or memorandum decision, or may be stated orally and recorded in 
open court. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also Hansen v. Hansen, 
736 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1989). Adequate findings are those that -(1) are 
sufficiently detailed, (2) include enough facts to disclose the 
process through which the ultimate conclusion is reached, (3) 
indicate the process is logical and properly supported, and (4) 
are not clearly erroneous.- Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 
203 (Utah App. 1987). Unless the record meets this standard, 
the issue of custody must be reversed. Id. 
The trial court in this case made no findings in conjunction 
with either the amendment of the divorce decree or the denial of 
LaRae's petition. With respect to the amendment, the court 
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demonstrated/ we are compelled to remand the case to the trial 
court for entry of appropriate findings.3 Those findings 
should articulate the considerations behind the initial award of 
custody and the order denying modification/ and should reflect 
the current legal standard for modification of custody.4 
The order denying LaRae's petition to modify custody of the 
two youngest children is vacated and the case is remanded for 
entry of appropriate findings. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
3. Without such findings, for example, it is difficult to 
distinguish Raymond's voluntary relinquishment of custody to 
LaRae from the situation in Tuckey v. Tuckev, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1982) (change of circumstances shown where mother is temporarily 
absent from state, leaving custody of children with 
grandparents). 
4. LaRae contends on appeal that she has demonstrated a 
sufficient change of circumstances to justify a modification of 
custody. Since we do not reach this issue, we have no occasion 
to consider whether the trial court correctly applied the legal 
standard as set forth in Elmer v. Elmer, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 
39-41 (1989); see also Mauqhan, 770 P.2d at 159-61. 
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